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During a sixty year history, farm bills have become
increasingly more d iverse and complex.   This is reflected
in the both the names of farm bills and in the number of
farm bill titles.  For example, the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1933 contained only 3 titles, compared with 10
titles in the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of
1973, 17 titles in the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981,
and 25 titles in the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and
Trade Act of 1990.  While conservation issues have been
addressed in farm legislation since the early 1930's,
conservation titles are a relatively recent addition (and
contain only a subset of the farm bill programs and
policies that affect natural resource use and quality).   For
example, an amendment to the Soil Conservation and
Domestic Allotment Act of 1935 created the Agricultural
Conservation Program—USDA’s primary cost-sharing
program— and the Agricultural Act of 1956 established the
Soil Bank Program.  Since 1981, conservation titles have
been included in farm bills.  The 1981 title (Title XV—
Resource Conservation) contained nearly a dozen
conservation initiatives, although most were never funded.
 Initiatives included grants to states to address unique local
problems and the establishment of a critical areas
conservation program targeted to erosion hot spots.
Clearly, farm bills are not the only vehicles for addressing
agriculture, conservation and environment policy.   Other
important legislation  with a bearing on conservation
goals, objectives and programs includes the Soil and
Water Resources Conservation Act of 1977 (Resource
Conservation Act), which requires USDA to periodically
prepare a national appraisal of the condition of the
nation’s privately owned soil, water and related resources.
The Clean Water Act— the nation’s most important water
quality protection law, the Safe Drinking W ater Act,
which sets standards for drinking water quality and public
water treatment systems, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
which removed subsidies for converting wetlands, are all
examples of legislation affecting resource use and quality
in the agricultural sector.
Farm bills are complex pieces of legislation and are
required to respond to multiple, and often conflicting
pressures.  Conservation or environmental concerns rarely
dominate the debate.  Other important factors include:
export market conditions; agricultural programs in
competitor countries; budget pressures; domestic supplies;
regional conflicts; the  level of farm income and farm
assets, and the continually evolving structure of the
agricultural sector.  Many of these themes were evident in
the mid-1980 's just prior to  the 1985 Food  Security Act,
which created many of the conservation programs still in
effect today.   In the mid-1980's, the farm sector was
experiencing significant financial vulnerability, budget
outlays for programs had reached record levels, and
exports were suffering under weak foreign demand
coupled with a rising dollar.  The 1977 National Resource
Inventories (NRI) and the 1980 RCA (the Appraisal
required by the Soil and Water Resources Act of 1977)
had provided the first comprehensive national estimates of
soil erosion which raised questions about the effectiveness
of  soil erosion programs.  In response, the 1985 Food
Security Act attempted to reduce budget outlays by
reducing target prices and freezing program yields but
farm income was protected with deficiency payments.  In
an attempt to improve the export picture, loan rates were
lowered to world price levels.  In response to concerns
about soil erosion and soil erosion programs,  the
conservation title authorized conservation compliance,
Sodbuster, Swampbuster, and the Conservation Reserve
Program (CRP).  The latter was not just an erosion control
program; CRP was also intended to curb production of
surplus commodities and to provide needed income
support for farmers. 
The Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of
1990 (FACTA) responded to a somewhat different set of
circumstances.  During the later-1980's export volume and
value had increased significantly.  With strong commodity
prices, farm program costs declined to $6.5 billion from a
record high of $26 b illion in 1986.  Continued pressure to
reduce the Federal budget deficit, promote exports, and
increase market orientation, were the dominant roles in
1990 farm bill debate.  To help control budget outlays,
FACTA eliminated payments on 15 percent of base
5acreage.  To encourage increased market orientation in the
sector,  FACTA also included planting “flexibility”, which
allowed farmers to plant alternative crops on a portion of
their land,  without losing base acreage.   Although
flexibility was introduced because it could provide budget
savings and allow farmers to better respond to the market,
flexibility was supported by environmentalists who argued
that producers need to be free to pursue alternative,
resource conserving,  rotations without program penalty.
 FACTA extended, with some adjustments and
clarification in program administration, conservation
compliance, Sodbuster, and Swampbuster.  The 1990 Act
also established the Agricultural Resources Conservation
Program to act as an umbrella program for the
Environmental Conservation Acreage Program (which
contains the Conservation Reserve Program and the
Wetlands Reserve Program), the Agricultural Water
Quality Protections Program (now known as the Water
Quality Incentives Program or W QIP), and the
Environmental Easement Program.  In addition, the 1990
Act augmented CRP with new wetlands, water quality,
and environmental easement provisions and the Wetlands
Reserve Program (W RP) was created to provide easement
payments and restoration cost shares to landowners who
permanently return prior converted of farmed wetlands to
wetland condition.
Clearly, significant conservation and environmental gains
were made in the conservation titles of the 1985 and 1990,
both in terms of introducing and refining conservation
policy tools and in terms of accommodating concerns
beyond soil erosion, such as enhancing water quality and
maintaining wildlife habitat.   In addition, changes in
commodity program provisions have lessened the negative
environmental effects attributed to  commodity price
supports and program planting restrictions.  Nevertheless,
conservation tools like compliance, land retirement, and
cost-sharing may need to undergo adjustments in order to
be more effective in meeting budget constraints,
accountability requirements, localized problems and
issues, and ever–evolving conservation objectives.   What
lessons have been learned that could lead to more cost-
effective policies and programs in the future? 
Lessons Learned Since 1981 
Lesson 1:  To improve environmental  policy design, both
the costs and the benefits of programs must be considered.
 Since 1983, USDA has spent close to $30 billion dollars
on conservation and water quality programs.   USD A's
conservation and water quality programs utilize a mixture
of technical assistance and education, cost-sharing
assistance and incentives for practice installation,  public
works projects,  paid land retirement for conservation
purposes, and research (USDA, ERS, 1994).  Other
conservation program costs  are  imbedded in
compliance–type programs, which eithe r restrict
production on certain types of land or require a
conservation plan in order to be eligible for USDA
benefits.  Other Federal agencies also allocate funds for
conservation and environmental programs that affect the
agricultural sector.  In FY 1994, the Environmental
Protection Agency allocated $655 million for water
quality, drinking water and pesticide programs; the Army
Corps of Engineers allocated $1,026 million for flood
control and wetlands programs;  the Department of
Interior allocated $1,261 million to mostly range
improvement and endangered species habitat conservation,
while State and local governments allocated $502 million
for a variety of programs.  Although millions have been
spent on conservation and environmental programs, the
total cost and benefits of these programs is not clear.  
One way to evaluate  conservation programs is to estimate
the net cost to the government.  Such costs include annual
rental payments for land retirement and the cost of
technical assistance and financial assistance.  But another
kind of calculation is necessary to fully evaluate
conservation programs.  This calculation, which cannot be
simply added to net government outlays, focuses on the
"social"  costs and benefits of programs.  The social costs
include the costs borne by farmers to comply with program
guidelines or regulations and  the costs to society should
fewer farm products be offered at higher prices due to a
changes in farming activities.   Social benefits include
improvements in on-farm productivity,  rural amenities
such as recreation and scenic beauty,  improved wildlife
habitat,   safer food supplies,  and cleaner surface and
groundwater supplies for  the public.    But measuring the
social cost and benefits is complicated by the fact  that
they are often not like other goods, such as corn or wheat,
with well-established markets and prices.  Consequently
economists use a variety of  methods to estimate how the
public benefits from clean water or improvements in
wildlife habitat (see Ribaudo and Hellerstein, 1992 for a
review of  these methods).
An evaluation of the Conservation Reserve Program
provides a good illustration of the importance of
calculating both the social benefits and costs of land
retirement.  It is widely recognized that the CRP has
achieved many of its objectives:  reducing soil erosion on
highly erodible land,  reducing sedimentation, improving
water quality, fostering wildlife habitat,  curbing the
production of surplus commodities and providing income
support for farmers (USDA, ERS, 1994).  To  date, the
Conservation Reserve Program has reduced soil erosion by
nearly 700  million tons per year, or 19 tons per acre on
average.  This is a 22 percent reduction in U.S. cropland
6erosion compared with conditions prior to CRP.  Most
CRP acres are planted in grass, but the CRP also includes
2.4 million acres of trees, 2 million acres of special
wildlife practices, 410,000 acres of wetlands, and 5,200
miles of  filter strips along waterways (USDA, ERS,
1994).
Osborn and Konyar estimated that in 1990,  the net social
benefits of the CRP were between at $4.2-$9 billion in
present value over the life of the program, which means
that the social benefits of CRP exceeded the social costs
by $4.2  - $9 billion.  The estimated social benefits
included increases in net farm income ($2.2-$6.3 billion),
preservation of soil productivity ($.6-$1.7 billion ),
improved surface water quality ($1.3 -$4.3 billion);  lower
damages due to  windblown dust ($.3-$.9 billion) and
enhancements to wildlife ($1.9-$3.1 billion).  The social
costs of the CRP include higher food costs to consumers
($2.9 - $7.8 billion),  the cost of establishing vegetative
cover on CRP acres ($.9-$2.4 billion) and USDA technical
assistance ($.1 billion).
A similar exercise estimates the economic costs of
conservation compliance,  which requires farmers to
implement conservation plans on highly erodible land if
they want to retain eligibility for USDA programs and
benefits.  Costs associated with conservation compliance
include the administrative costs of implementing plans and
the supply and price effects associated with the on-farm
costs of implementing conservation plans.   The benefits
include maintaining on farm productivity and the value
associated with reducing the off-farm effects of so il
erosion (USDA, ERS, 1994).  Recent estimates indicate
that the benefits of conservation compliance exceed the
costs: for every dollar of combined public and private
expenditure required by the conservation compliance,   $2
in benefits are realized by the public (USDA, ERS, 1994).
Although these estimates are subject to revision as
methods and data improve they,  nevertheless,  are useful
in helping policymakers think about how to evaluate the
effectiveness of current  programs and how to design more
cost–effective environmental programs.
Lesson 2:  Commodity programs can be designed to
support environmental goals, up to a point.   For many
years, commodity programs, which are primarily designed
to support farm income,  were associated with creating
incentives to bring marginal farm land into production and
increase the use of potentially damaging farm chemicals.
Program planting restrictions often were at odds with good
stewardship as farmers planted  to maximize program
benefits.    But the negative role of commodity programs
has diminished over the last ten years as program
provisions have been adjusted to reflect environmental
concerns.  Two basic types of adjustments have been
made: those that reduce the incentives to "farm the
programs" and those that require farmers to implement
conservation plans or restrict use of certain kinds of land
to remain eligible for commodity and other program
benefits.
Adjustment of the first type include freezing payment
yields in the 1985 Act—payments can no longer be
increased if farmers increased yields.  This provision may
increase the incentive to adopt better nutrient and pest
management practices.  The 1990 Act introduced the
Integrated Farm Management Program Option (IFMPO),
which allows farmer to adopt resource-conserving crop
rotations without losing farm program benefits.    Flexible
base acreage was also introduced in the 1990 Act and
permits farmers to plant a portion of base acreage to the
non–base crops  while protecting their historical base
acreage.  Flexibility was promoted as a way to reduce
budget outlays and increase the incentives for  farmers to
adopt environmentally sounder crop  rotations.  As
currently implemented,  flexibility provisions provide
producers with payments on up to 85% of their eligible
base; on the remaining  15%, producers have the option to
plant the program commodity or to flex into a variety of
alternative corps or leave the land idle.  Producers have
the option of forgoing deficiency payments on an
additional 10% of their program crop base and plant the
acreage to an alternative crop.  Flexibility provisions
increase incentives to plant for the market, not for the
deficiency payment,  and have resulted primarily in
decreases of corn and wheat acreage and increased
soybean acreage.  Environmental benefits, although not a
certainty,  can result if the new crop rotation uses fewer
agricultural chemicals,  as would be the case in a
corn/soybean rotation,  or is less erosive, or leaves more
land id le (but appropriately managed). 
Provisions that require specific performance from farmers
to retain eligibility for USDA commodity programs and
benefits include conservation compliance, Sodbuster and
Swampbuster— all introduced in the 1985 Act .
Conservation compliance requires that any lands classified
as highly erodible must be farmed using an approved
conservation systems in order to retain eligibility for
USDA program benefits.  Sodbuster and Swampbuster
focused on protecting non-cropped highly erodible land
and nonconverted wetlands, respectively.   Compliance-
type programs are considered effective but some are
concerned about their limited scope as they only address
a few environmental  problems and have not been used to
achieve comprehensive soil quality, water quality, or
wildlife goals, which are now understood to be as
important as soil erosion (Canning, 1994; National
Research Council, 1993 ).    Additionally,  their
7effectiveness is dependent on program participation— if
commodity programs become unattractive to farmers for
any reason, the compliance leverage is weakened.   Those
that argue that compliance could be expanded to include
additional environmental goals, perhaps through the use of
a whole-farm plan,  must consider both the costs (to
farmers, USDA, States) and benefits of a more
comprehensive program.   On-farm costs that are either too
high or perceived to be too high could affect participation
rates and drive some farmers, possibly those on the most
vulnerable land, out of the programs,  defeating the
compliance purpose. 
By removing disincentives to better stewardship,
commodity programs can be made  "greener" ,  and in
some cases also help reduce the overall cost of commodity
programs.  But innovative programs such as the IFMPO
are under subscribed—while up to 5 million acres may be
enrolled annually, less than 400,000 acres were enrolled
between 1991 and 1994.  And relatively few acres eligible
for flex actually flex into an alternative crop, mostly
because opportunities for increasing profit are limited:
most farmers are already growing the optimal mix. 
Although additional ad justments in commodity programs
such as increasing flexibility or enrolling more acres in the
IFMPO will likely provide only small environmental
gains, these adjustments will continue if they can reduce
budget outlays and allow farmers to respond to market
conditions. . 
Lesson 3:  Targeting environmental programs improves
cost-effectiveness.   As defined by the National Research
Council (1993),  targeting "directs technical assistance,
educational efforts,  financial resources, or regulations, to
those regions where  soil and water quality improvements
are the most needed,  or those enterprises that cause a
disproportionate  portion of soil and water quality
problems."   Although targeting clearly requires
policymakers and the public to articulate environmental
goals,  targeting conservation programs requires better
information that links farm practices to environmental
quality and identifies those regions that contribute to
problems (NRC, 1993).  The role of economists,  who
stress targeting as a way to improve the economic
efficiency and cost-effectiveness of conservation
programs, is to identify how (and where) the
environmental benefits per program dollar can be
maximized.
Targeting is already a feature of many Federal
environmental programs.  Several of the activities
associated with USDA's Water Quality Program are
directed specifically at problem regions.  For example, the
74 Hydrologic Unit Area  Projects (HUA) are located in
watersheds with identified nonpoint-source water quality
problems.  Landowners receive financial and technical
assistance to implement water quality practices to meet
State goals.   W ater Quality Special Projects extend cost-
share assistance to farmer and ranchers for installing
approved water quality practices in watersheds with
identified agricultural nonpoint source problems (USDA,
ERS, 1994).
Many of these targeting activities are funded through
USD A's primary cost-sharing program, the Agricultural
Conservation Program, which began in 1936.  In the past,
USD A's cost-sharing approach to conservation has been
criticized  for offering widely available funds for projects
that improve on-farm productivity and income, such as
draining of hydric soils,  but may have limited impact on
environmental quality.   Recently, cost-share programs
have been aimed at meeting pub lic conservation goals in
targeted regions.  But cost-share funding has declined
dramatically during the last few years and there will likely
be increased pressure  to better target remaining cost-share
funds.  Possible avenues include innovative programs such
as the Water Quality Incentives Projects  (WQIP), which
is designed to achieve reductions of nonpoint sources
agricultural pollutants in a environmentally and
economically sound  manner.  WQIP (currently 242
projects) is targeted to small watersheds:  agricultural
producers are provided with the necessary financial
assistance required to make changes in management
systems to restore or enhance water resources impaired by
agricultural source of pollution (USDA, ERS, 1994).  The
success of targeted cost-sharing programs like WQIP
depend on appropriate funding, coord ination across
USDA, and carefully adjusting payments levels to achieve
maximum benefit per cost-share dollar.
Targeting is also an important topic in discussions about
the future of the CRP:   how can environmental benefits be
maximized for any given level of CRP funding?   W hile
the early CRP sign-ups achieved one kind of
targeting—only highly erodible land was eligib le—it is
recognized that other kinds of land can provide higher
benefits per program dollar (Heimlich and Osborn, 1994).
 Indeed, since 1990,  the CRP bid assessment process has
explicitly ranked each offered parcel according to an index
of environmental benefits, which included multiple
criteria,  and selected the parcel with the highest
environmental benefit per dollar of rental payment
(Heimlich and O sborn, 1994).  Alternative targeting
approaches are being explored to determine how to
maximize environmental benefits for any new acres
enrolled in the CRP  (Heimlich and Osborn, 1994;
Babcock, 1995). 
Lesson 4:  Conservation policies need to rely on a mixture
of approaches.   There is no one approach that can meet
8all conservation and environmental goals.  Most Federal
and State policies use a mixture of regulations, economic
incentives and voluntary approaches backed by
demonstration projects and technical assistance.  Finding
the right mix of approaches, and subjecting them to critical
review, is crucial under shrinking budgets and increasing
concerns over the effectiveness and cost of some
programs.   Meeting the public's demand for
environmental protection will require innovative
approaches at the State and Federal levels as well as
coord ination across Federal and State policies.
It is well known that competitive markets and competitive
prices  often fail to account for environmental
consequences,  such as the effect of farming on water
quality.  The value of these effects is not fully reflected in
private costs producers and processors pay for inputs or
when farmers decide what and how to produce.   Instead,
the public often bears the costs when agricultural runoff,
sediment or farm chemicals degrade the quality of the
nation's resources.  Governments, through public  policy,
can make environmental improvement a requirement—
through regulations—or a matter of self-interest, through
the use of economic policy instruments, such as taxes,
subsides, education, and  market incentives.  
Agriculture is affected by a broad range of regulation, such
as those issued through the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act and  the amendments to the Coastal
Zone Management Act.  Regulations are often the policy
instrument of choice when restriction of an action, such as
the use of a particular pesticide or the location of a feed
lot,  is in the best interest of the public at large.  But
regulations can be costly and difficult to implement. 
Regulations such as design standards (restrictions on farm-
level input use or "approved" land management practices)
are generally associated with low administrative costs  but
because they tend to be generic prescriptions rather than
least-cost plans,  some farmers are required to apply
standards that do not minimize costs, which is an
unnecessary financial burden. (Shortle and Dunn, 1991).
 Performance standards, such as specified maximum levels
of soil erosion or sediment flows,  can be difficult and
costly to monitor.  Like design standards, performance
standards  are unlikely to be cost-minimizing means of
achieving an environmental goal (Shortle and Dunn,
1991).    
Economists argue for the use of economic instruments,
such as taxes, subsidies, and market-based incentives to
achieve environmental goals.  Taxes impose costs on
undesired activities, letting farmers and processors find the
least-cost formula to avoid these added costs.   But taxes
are often not well suited to address many environmental
problems such as non-point source problems, where  it is
often impossible to find the exact source of pollution and
thus levy an  appropriate tax on sediment flows or
chemicals leaching into waterways.  Incentive-based
polices such as pollution trading, can likely be used only
in limited geographic regions.   One possible trading
scheme to reduce pollution in a watershed would allow
point pollution sources (such as sewer treatment plants) to
fund programs to reduce nonpoint sources (such as
agriculture).  Such a scheme is shown to be cost effective
in areas with both point and nonpoint sources of pollution,
areas with point loadings supplied by large sources, and
areas with significant unmet agricultural conservation
needs However, these criteria only describe a small
number of watersheds (Letson, 1992).  Another incentive
based mechanism, used for wetlands restoration, is
mitigation banking, which allows a landowner to develop
or convert a wetland in one area if  there is an ecologically
compensating wetland restoration in another site. 
Med ium-term volun ta ry  pa id  land ret irement
(Conservation Reserve Program) and permanent
easements (such as the Wetlands Reserve Program) carry
a particularly high price tag, making them of limited use in
a tight budgetary environment.   And conservation
programs based on compliance mechanisms are  only
effective if the environmental problems are concentrated
on farm operations producing program crops and are also
participating in the farm programs.  If prob lems are on
other types of operations or if programs become less
attractive and  cover fewer production activities,  leverage
will weaken and fewer environmental benefits will result
from conservation compliance.   
Cost–sharing and o ther financial assistance are designed
to help farmers overcome investment and adjustment costs
associated with the adoption of a new practices.  In FY
1994, cost–sharing accounted for about 5 percent of
USDA conservation expenditures, mostly through the
Agriculture Conservation Program (ACP).  In 1983, prior
to the CRP, cost–sharing accounted for close to 20 percent
of conservation expenditures (USDA, ERS, 1994).  ACP
provides financial assistance (up to 75 percent of the total
cost of implementation with a maximum of  $3,500 per
person per year) to farmers who implement technical
practices designed to solve a broad range of conservation
and environmental  problems. Financial assistance can be
a valuable tool but its effectiveness may be limited by a
poorly designed payment schedule or a lack of targeting.
The WQIP (operated through ACP)  is designed to reduce
the negative impacts of agricultural activities on ground
and surface water and  provide financial incentives to
farmers who agree to implement approved, non-structural
management practices.  Producers receive an incentive
payment, which is not a cost-share payment in the
9traditional sense, but a payment that compensates them for
the added costs or risk associated with the new
management practice.  However, the $3 ,500  ACP limit,
the incentive  payments themselves,  the long-term
profitability of  the practice, or a lack of managerial
know–how may be limiting enrollment in W QIP .  A recent
study by the Sustainable Agriculture Coalition found that
per-acre incentive payments for many practices may be too
low to attract some producers (Higgins, 1995).
Alternative management systems supported by WQIP are
often more complex than current systems (Dobbs,
Bischoff, Henning, and Pflueger, 1995) and place more
importance on producer know–how (and on technical
assistance programs).  In other cases, producers may be
willing to adopt certain practices without an incentive
payment, if they are provided sufficient information on the
practices  (Feather and Cooper, 1995).
Lesson 5:  The role of technology is critical to meeting
environmental challenges.  Research provides the
foundation for technological  innovation and productivity
growth.  Public sector research, such as that conducted by
USDA and State universities, is needed when there are few
financial incentives for the private  sector  investment into
research.  This is particularly the case for basic research
and for some applied research such as environmental
protection, natural  resource conservation and food safety
(Ruttan, 1982).  While public sector research is needed,
funding levels have been roughly constant at about $2
billion annually (in 1990  dollars)  since the late 1970 ' s
(USDA, ERS, 1994).  About one–third of public research
expenditures is allocated to reducing the production costs
of food and forest products;  24 percent is allocated to pest
and disease protection; and 14 percent to natural resource
management.   
Although research and development of new technologies
is vital,  transferring technologies to farmers and ranchers
is of equal importance.  Agricultural technology is often
transferred through technical assistance and demonstration
projects.   Yet concerns have been raised that technical
guidance sometimes fails to include the full range of
availab le management practices to address environmental
needs  (National Research Council, 1994).  This is partly
attributable to Federal conservation policies, which have
primarily stressed controlling of soil erosion often without
considering other environmental concerns, such as water
quality.  This has, at times,  led to prescribed management
practices that may be in conflict with other management
practices (Deere and Company Technical  Center, 1995).
To avoid this conflict and maximize environmental
benefits per technical assistance dollar,  technical
assistance needs to include the full complement of
availab le technology and consider an enterprise's complete
environmental needs. 
An extensive body of economic research has focused on
the factors that affect the decision to adopt new
technology.   Important factors include policy variables,
input and output prices, the cost of the new technology,
farm size, type of farm, and education levels .  In the case
of technologies that are designed to address environmental
problems, Caswell and Shoemaker (1993) have
demonstrated that technology adoption also depends on
environmental characteristics.  That is,  the range of
resource characteristics, such as susceptibility to pest
infestation,  surface or ground water vulnerability, and
erodib ility will determine the effectiveness of policies
meant to encourage the use of new technologies to solve
environmental problems.
USDA has long stressed technological solutions to
environmental problems, through technical assistance,
demonstration projects, and education.   Technical
assistance is an important factor in the adoption process
because new practices often require a greater degree of
management and skill than conventional practices and
operators may not be able to apply the practice without
specialized assistance.  
Without a supply of readily available, cost-effective
technologies, farmers have little incentive to voluntarily
change current practices.   The development and transfer
of new technologies,  the interaction between conservation
policy and technology,  the factors affecting the demand
for technology all play an important role in meeting
environmental goals.  
The 1995 Farm Bill: Lessons Applied? 
Prior to the 1994 election and the Congressional emphasis
on budget reduction, there were several proposals for
improving curre nt con serva tion programs and
policies—some clearly building on lessons learned since
1981.  In addition to proposals concentrating on targeting
schemes for the CRP, other proposals were built on the
concept of financial assistance programs that  reward
farmers for either mitigating existing environmental
damage or improving environmental management.
Proposed programs were typically vo luntary and payments
were designed to cover some or all of the start-up or
installation costs of the alternative management practice.
Payments were targeted to the most vulnerable regions and
the programs were typically funded through Federal and/or
state governments. Other innovative proposals included:
Green Ticket Certification, which would require
specification of a set of environmental and
resource conservation performance standards
which, if attained, qualify a farm operator for
financial benefits ( Benbrook, 1994)
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An Environmental Stewardship Incentive
Program that would provide higher deficiency
payments or direct cash payments to agricultural
producers and landowners who voluntarily adopt
farm plans developed in cooperation with
certified environmental stewards (Petrucci, B.,
1994).
The Environmental Enhancement Investment
Program that would consolidate all USDA
conservation programs (except CRP, WRP, and
Conservation Compliance) into one voluntary,
incentive-based program based on a total
resource management plan for the farm.
Provides technical and financial assistance to
implement the plan (NASDA, 1995)
The Conservation Credit Initiative, which would
offer  property tax credits to producers who
voluntarily apply approved conservation plans.
Plans are developed by the farmer, with technical
assistance from the local conservation district,
partly supported by USDA funding Sullivan, K.,
1994)
After the November, 1994 election and the emphasis on
budget reduction, it become clear that proposals calling for
increased conservation funding were not likely to be
seriously considered.  In recent months, as deadlines
approach, several budget–conscience bills related to the
farm and conservation issues have been introduced2.  For
example:  “Freedom to Farm” (H .R. 2195), converts
current payments to farmers (based on production) into
fixed payments that are gradually reduced over seven
years and gives farmers 100 percent flexibility.  Freedom
to Farm does not explicitly address conservation programs
other than conservation compliance, which is retained. 
The Agricultural Resources Conservation Act of 1995 (S.
854), authorizes an environmentally targeted Conservation
Reserve Program, a Wetland Reserve Program, and
introduces  the Agricultural Environmental Quality
Incentives Program (EQIP), which stresses prudent
management of resources as opposed to idling land.  EQIP
combines many of USDA cost–share programs into a
single program, and increases conservation assistance to
livestock production. Annual funding for CRP and EQIP
would be mandatory, funded under the Commodity Credit
Corporation, which currently funds commodity programs.
The Administration’s Guidance for the Farm Bill outlines
the Administration’s farm 1995 bill position.  With respect
to conservation and environment, the Guidance has three
recomm endations:  (1) re latively minor, mostly
administrative adjustments to programs linked to
commodity programs (conservation compliance and
Swampbuster); (2) reaffirmed support, with suggestions
for increased targeting,  for USDA’s major land retirement
programs, the Wetlands Reserve Program and the
Conservation Reserve Program; and (3) a blueprint for
streamlining USDA’s technical and financial assistance
tools.  The latter is a proposal to make conservation
programs more streamlined and effective, through the
proposed Coordinated Conservation Assistance Program
which focuses on: (1) simplifying the set of conservation
technical and financial assistance tools; (2) increasing
local involvement and control over conservation
programs; and (3) site-specific conservation plans for
farms or ranches that serve the comprehensive needs of
these operations.  One goal is to move toward one-stop
shopping for conservation assistance and to provide
conservation programs that are consistent with sound
agronomic and economic princip les. 
With budget reduction as the dominant theme for the
104th Congress and for farm bill debate, a farm bill as we
know it appears unlikely.  Instead,  the budget
reconciliation bill now moving through Congress is
expected to cover the major funding issues that would
normally be included in separate farm bill legislation.
Under a budget reduction umbrella, increased funding for
conservation appears unlikely, but there may be
opportunities to improve the performance of  remaining
conservation programs by incorporating components of
recent proposals and minding the many lessons learned
since 1981 . 
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ENDNOTES
1. The views expressed in this paper are the author’s and
do not necessarily represent the views of the Economic
Research or the Department of Agriculture.
2.  The 1990 Farm Bill provides the legislative authority
through the 1995 marketing year for commodity.  Many
conservation programs expire at the end of 1995.  The
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 extends some
program provision through 1997.  Failure to pass new
farm legislation causes many programs to revert to
originating or permanent legislation.  Without new
legislation, many conservation programs would be
eliminated.
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